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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS P. WILLIAMS and 
JO ANN H. WILLIAMS, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11388 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent, State of Utah, by and through its Road 
Commission, initiated a condemnation action to acquire a 
fee simple interest in certain properties owned by the ap-
pellant and located at approximately Cherry Lane and Uni-
tah Junction, Davis County, Utah. The aquisition cons.isted 
of .10 acres from a total of .43 acres. The portion with-
in the take was in a rectangular shape approximately 37 feet 
in width and 114.64 feet in length and was located on the 
west side of appellant's property. 
The sole issue presented by this appeal is the compen-
sability of certain damages allegedly sustained by appel-
lants. 
,..,. 
L. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was heard by the Honorable Parley E. Nor-
seth, sitting without a jury. The court rendered a judgment 
in favor of appellant and against respondent in the amount 
of $7 50.00 for the .10 acre involved in the take and $3,200 for 
severance damages to the remainder, for a total judgment of 
$3,950.00. 
Trial counsel for respondent, as distinguished from 
counsel for respondent on this appeal, filed an objection to 
defendants' findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.26.) 
However, no record of the disposition of respondent's ob-
jection exists. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent •grees with the statement of facts as set 
forth in appella ~s· brief with the following modifications. 
Because of the lack of a transcript of the trial proceedings, 
appellant's reference to the testimony of respondent's inde· 
pendent fee appfiaiser, Memory Cain, is based solely on the 
affidavit of couni>el for appellant. However, respondent sub-
mits that by the certification of the issue presented to this 
cou.rt on appeal, appellants have conceded the fact that the 
damages for which appellants were denied compensation 
were not special, unique or peculiar to appellants' property, 
but were, rather, the type of damage sustained by the public 
in general. 
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Respondent would also disagree wi'th appellants' state-
ment that the issue presented by this appeal. was resolved 
in the case of Board of Education of Logan City v. Croft, 
13 U.2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962). 
ARGUMENT 
It must first be recognized and conceded that not all 
potential elements of damage are compensable. The pro-
duction of evidence of ~n alleged damage is not proof that 
such damage is an item entitling an aggrieved landowner to 
compensation. The determination of the existence of a com-
pensable severance damage as against a noncompensabJe; 
consequential damage must be made by the trial· court as a 
matter of law. The instant case presents the issue of what 
criteria must be utilized in determining whether an alleged 
aggrieance is properly includable within an award for sev-
erance damage. 
The framework within which condemnation cases are 
tried is not blanket authority on which the Jandowner may 
predicate any conceivable damage. As sta ~d in State of 
Arizona v. Wilson, et al, 4 Ariz.App. 420, < ;0 P.2d 992i 998 
(1966): t J 
... we do not believe that our Supreme Court has · 
intended the "before" versus "after" test to be used . 
in such manner as to include noncompensable dam~ 
age within the award to proper'ty owners in con-
demnation actions. 
Also, in People v. Ricciardi; 144 P.29 779 (1944), the Su-
preme Court of California stated at 144 P.2d 802, "not ever:V 
depreciation in the value of property not taken can be made 
the basis of an award for damages." 
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The distinction between compensable severance damages 
and noncompensable consequential damages is predicated on 
a test or requirement that contains two separate, but con-
junctive, considerations. Although the test has been enunc-
iated in many jurisdictions, it has sustained only minor mod-
ifications in the terminology involved and not basic dis-
crepancies in the foundation, logic or reason of the test. 
The first consideration in determining the element of 
compensability is that the damage to the remaining property 
must be a direct result and causily connected to the diminu-
tion in value of the remaining property by virtue of 
the loss of the area included with the take. 
This court has recognized this requirement in State by 
State Road Commission v. Rozzelle, 101 U. 464, 120 P.2d 276 
(1941), wherein it is stated at 120 P.2d 278: 
To the extent that the present taking or construction 
so violates condemnees rights, he is entitled to re-
cover; but be the loss what it may it must have a 
causal connection with the taking of the property 
or construction thereon. (Emphasis added.) 
Also, this court has recently stated in State of Utah, by 
and through its Road Commission, v. Stanger, 21 U.2d 
185, 442 P.2d 941 (1968): 
... that severance damages were those suffered by 
a devaluation of the owner's property not taken, the 
sausa causa causans of which was the actual taking 
of a part of a unit of property, the whole of which 
he previously owned. (442 P.2d 942). 
The existence of this first requirements 1s recognized 
by appellant on page 17 of appellants' brief. 
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The second consideration is that the damage resulting 
to the remaining property must be such as to be special, 
unique and peculiar to that property and not sustained by the 
public in genera.I. 
In Department of Public Works and Building v. Hub-
bard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N.E.2d 383 (1936), the Supreme Court 
of Illinois stated at 1 N.S.2d 385: 
To entitle a claimant in a condemnation proceeding 
to compensation for lands not taken, he must prove 
by competent evidence that there has been some 
direct physical disturbance of a right, either public 
or private, which he enjoys in connection with his 
property, and that by reason of such disturbance 
he has sustained a special damage with respect to 
his property in excess of that sustained by the public 
generally. (Emphasis ·added.) 
See also Illinois-Iowa Power Co. v. Guest, 370 Ill. 160, 
18 N.E.2d 193 (1938). 
In State of New Mexico v. Silva, 71 N.Mex. 350 378 P.2d 
595 (1962), the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated at 
378 P.2d 596: 
Courts are agreed that only one whose damage, oc-
casioned by highway improvement, is special and 
direct as distinguished from remote and consequent-
ial, and which differs in kind from that of the gen-
eral public, suffers a compensable injury. 
The State of Wyoming has also followed this principal 
in Sheridan Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. State of Wyoming, 
384 P.2d 579 (1963). and State Highway Commission.'!r of 
Wyoming v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606 (1964). 
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In City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 210 P.2d 717 (1949), 
the California District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
stated at 210 P.2d 723: 
While the recovery of damages is not limited to in-
stances of actual invasion of the land itself, yet 
damages can be justified only by evidence of direct 
physical disturbances of an existing right, either 
public or private, which the owner possesses in con-
nection with his property and which gives an addit-
ional value to it and by evidence that through such 
disturbance he has sustained a special damage with 
respect to his property or to a right appurtenant 
thereto different from or in excess of that suffered 
by the public in general. 
In Muse v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 103 
So.2d 839 (1958), the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated 
that severance damages should be computed without con-
sidering, " ... general benefits or injuries resulting from 
the use to which the land taken is to be put, and are shared 
by the general public." (At 103 So.2d 849). 
The basic distinction between compensable severance 
damage and noncompensable consequential damage may 
thus be stated as follows: Damages to a remaining property 
which are directly and causily connected to the taking or 
the construction activities thereon and which are special, 
unique and peculiar and not sustained by the public in gen-
eral may be considered compensable. Those damages to the 
remaining property which are not causily connected to the 
take or are not special, unique or peculiar from those suf-
fered by the public in general are not compensable. 
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By certification of the issue presented by this appeal, 
appellants concede that the damages not a'llowed by the 
trial court were not of a special, unique and peculiar nature, 
but were, rather, of the type and nature sustained by the 
public in general. Also, appellants do not challenge the trial 
court findings in this· regard. Rather, appellan'ts insist 
findings that the requirement of special, unique and peculiar 
damage does not exist. 
The necessity of the conjunctive application of the two 
requirements may be illustrated. To comply with the cri-
teria of compensable severance damage as se1t forth in State 
of Utah, by and through its Road Commi!;sion v. Stanger, 
supra, the damages to the remainder must be directly caused 
and connected to tbe take. However, if the damage to the 
by the public in general, it may not be said to be direct 
by the pulblici n general, it may not be said to be the direct 
result of the take. 
In the instant case, appellants concede that the damage 
which was not allowed by the trial court was not. of the 
special nature. How can it then be said to be the causa-causa 
causans of which was the actual physical appropriation of 
the take. 
Damages of the type complained .of by appellants accur 
nothwiths'tanding the physical appropriation o.f lack thereof. 
The existence of this type of damage is not dependent on 
or related to the take. Rather, it affects those who suffer no 
loss of property as well as those whose sustain a partial loss. 
When thus sustained by all, the public in general, the 
damage may not be said to be the direct result of .the take. 
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If a damage is of such a nature as to exist irrespective 
of the take or the absence thereof, then such damage must 
be considered noncompensable consequential damage. 
In an effort to render the alleged damages compensable, 
appellants have attempted to distinguish the rule regarding 
compensation between cases involving severance damage to 
a remaining portion, part of which is taken, and damages 
sustained by a landowner although no property is taken. 
This distinction is evidently predicated on the language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(2) and (3) (1953). However, this 
statute is a definition of what constitutes just compensation 
as set forth under Utah Const. art. I § 22, and must be so 
interpreted and construed. 
A review of the historical interpretation given to the 
words "taken" and ''damages" as used in Utah Const. are. I 
§ 22 reveals that this court has considered the constitutional 
rights of compensation to be equal whether or not a physical 
appropriation of a landowner's property has occurred. 
In other words, the issue of compensable damages in a 
situation involving a partial take and a situation involving 
no physical appropriation of property remain the same. 
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Railroad, 28 U. 207, 77 P. 849 (1904), 
and Twenty-Second Corporation v. Oregon Shortline Rail-
road, 36 U. 238, 103 P. 243 (1909). 
This court in State by State Road Commission v. Dis-
trict Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 U. 384, 778 P.2d 502 
(1937), stated at 78 P.2d 510: 
The constitution clearly does not require compen-
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sation for damages not recognized as actionable at 
common law, but for damaging of property "to the 
actionable degree" the constitution makers intended 
the landowner to have just compensation equally 
with the landowner whose property was physically 
taken. 
It was thus developed that the situation involving a 
partial take and damages to the remainder and damage to 
property no part of which was taken in condemnation re-
quired equal treatment under the constitutional requirement 
of j us't compensation. 
The equality that exists between the two types of 
situations is complete except for a procedural distinction 
required by the application of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, 
349 P.2d 157 (1960). As stated in Hampton v. State of Utah, 
by and through its Road Commission, et al, 21 U.2d 342, 445 
P.2d 708 (1968), at 21 U.2d 344. 
It should be observed that this court has developed 
a procedural distinction between a "taking" and 
"damage," where the landowner has been denied 
recovery in a situation involving the liability of a 
highway authority for consequential damages. 
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity neces-
sitated a procedural distinction between partial take cases 
and cases involving damage to property no part of Which 
was appropriated, the considerations as to the compensability 
of damages remained the same. In Springville Banking Co. 
v. Burton, supra, Certain consequential damages were con-
sidered to be noncompensable. This court refused to employ 
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the extraordinary writ of mandamus because o'f the issue ol 
sovereign immunity. However, this court further stated at 
10 U.2d 102: 
In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield to 
the common weal albeit injury to their property 
may result. We espouse the notion that if the sov-
ereign exercises its police power, reasonably and 
for the good of all the people, w'hen constructing 
highways, consequential damages such as those 
alleged here, are not compensable. 
The noncompensability of the consequential damages 
involved was clearly stated notwithstanding the applica-
tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Appellants have failed to recognize this court's position 
in Provo River Water Users Association v. Carlson, 103 U 93, 
133 P.2d 777 (1943), wherein this court stated at 133 P.2d 
779: 
All of the cases in this court, which we have been 
able to find, have predicated b o th severance 
damages and damages to lands not taken, on some 
physical injury to land not condemned. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
This court specifically and consistently has refused to 
recognize a distinction predicated on the appropriation or 
failure of appropriation of a landowner's property. To now 
do so would be to do violence to precedent and contrary to 
the recognized constitutional intention to place landowners 
on an equal parity in determining damages nothwithstand· 
ing the partial taking or lack thereof of a landowner's 
property. 
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Appellants place strong reliance on the case of Board of 
Education of Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 U.Zd 
310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962). However, respondent submits that 
that case is distinguishable on its facts from the prohlem 
presented in the instant case and further, that the dicta 
contained in the Croft case is not sufficient to overrule the 
precedent and reasoning that has evolved since the enact-
ment of the Utah State Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have conceded that the alleged severance 
damages not allowed by the trial court was no't of such a nat-
ure as to be special, unique and peculiar to the remaining 
property owned by appellant, or that the damage was in ex-
cess of that sustained by the public in general. Based on the 
rule that damages, to be compensable, must be causily con-
nected to the take and also be a special, unique and peculair 
nature not sus'tained by the public in general, the ruling 
of the trial court was manifestly correct. 
The great weight of authority recognizes a ,casual 
connection requirement of a special, unqiue and pectJliar 
damage in order to render the alleged damages compensable. 
To distinguish between a situation involving a partial take 
and a situation involving damage although no property is 
physically appropriated, is a failure to re'cognize the 
precedent of establishing the landowners in both situations 
on an equal parity. The determination of the compensa:bili'ty 
of damages in both situations is the same and the only dif-
ference between the two is a procedural distinction neces-
ssi tated by and through the application of the doctdne of 
::overeign immunity. To allow otherwise would be to dis-
1.2 
criminate against the landowner whose property was not 
physically appropriated but who, in fact, sustained the 
same damages as the landowner who suffered a partial tak-
ing of his property. In Utah, this court has failed to recog-
nize such a disparity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
